Must Improved Labor Standards Hurt Accumulation in an Open Developing Economy? A Structuralist Analysis of the Cambodian Case by Razmi, Arslan
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2008
Must Improved Labor Standards Hurt
Accumulation in an Open Developing Economy?
A Structuralist Analysis of the Cambodian Case
Arslan Razmi
University of Massachusetts - Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Razmi, Arslan, "Must Improved Labor Standards Hurt Accumulation in an Open Developing Economy? A Structuralist Analysis of the
Cambodian Case" (2008). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 21.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/21
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
 
 
Must Improved Labor Standards Hurt 
Accumulation in an Open Developing Economy? 
A Structuralist Analysis of the Cambodian Case 
 
by 
 
Arslan Razmi 
 
Working Paper 2008-09 
 
Must Improved Labor Standards Hurt
Accumulation in an Open Developing Economy?
A Structuralist Analysis of the Cambodian Case
Arslan Razmi
824 Thompson Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003
August 13, 2008
Abstract
Using a modied version of the dependent economy framework, this
paper analyzes a stylized small economy that is signicantly open to trade
and investment ows. The analysis, which is inspired by the structure of
Cambodias economy and ongoing e¤orts by international organizations
to raise labor standards in that country, initially classies the economy
into three sectors: a manufacturing sector that produces tradable goods, a
sector that produces (tourism-related) tradable services, and a rural sector
that produces non-tradables. By assuming sectoral di¤erences based on
stylized facts, we attempt to analyze the consequences of various shocks
in a comparative static framework. Furthermore, we evaluate the short-
run e¤ects of raising labor standards. Finally, we explore the impact of
higher standards in the manufacturing sector on the near- and long-term
prospects of the economy using comparative dynamic analysis to analyze
changes in output, relative prices, income distribution and accumulation.
1 Introduction and Motivation
International economists have traditionally found it useful for analytical pur-
poses to sub-divide economies into a tradable and a non-tradable sector. The
price of the tradable good is (mainly) dictated by international market condi-
tions while that of the non-tradable good is determined by conditions at home.
In the limiting case of a small open economy, where purchasing power parity
holds, the importable and exportable goods are bundled into an aggregate trad-
able good, and the real internal exchange rate (dened as the relative price of
tradables) determines the sectoral distribution of resources and demand.
This paper analyzes a small open economy of a somewhat di¤erent nature.
Ever since its recovery began in the post-Khmer Rouge period, the Cambodian
economy has undergone major structural changes. To take just a few indicators,
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trade has increased as a proportion of GDP from 69 percent in 1996 to 139
percent in 2006. Manufactured exports are now almost 98 percent of total
merchandise exports. Moreover, of these, textiles and garments constitute
almost three-fourths.1 Much of the manufactured exports originate from highly
import-intensive, vertically integrated international supply chains where prot
margins are thin and most of the value addition takes place outside of Cambodia.
At the same time, Cambodia has also seen its trade in services grow rapidly to a
point where it now constitutes almost 30 percent of GDP. International tourism
exports alone account for a quarter of total exports of goods and services. A
signicant proportion of the expansion in these tradable sectors has been driven
by foreign direct investment (FDI).
These features of the economy, along with the presence of a highly dollar-
ized urban segment existing side by side with a riel-based traditional sector
that mainly produces agricultural products and non-tradables makes Cambo-
dia an interesting economy to analyze in the sense that it encourages us to
introduce important structural nuances into the traditional small country open
economy models. More specically, it raises questions about the adequacy of
the dependent economy model when thinking about long-run growth-related
issues. For example, a body of development literature has highlighted the
critical importance of shifting resources from the non-tradable to the tradable
sector. In the case of a small open economy with a huge tourism sector, this
may not always be the best move if the scope for productivity growth is limited
in this sector. Another example would be that of labor standards. Cambodia
is currently part of a pioneering e¤ort called the Better Factories program
sponsored by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank,
under which Cambodian apparel manufacturers are provided an incentive to
improve their working conditions by o¤ering increased access to the US market
in return for demonstrated improvements. What are the likely e¤ects of such
a program in the Cambodian context? The answer depends on, among other
things, what happens to the rest of the economy. The resulting consequences
for the services sector, for instance, may determine changes in short-run output
and relative prices as well as the path of long-run growth.
This paper can broadly be seen as consisting of two inter-related bodies of
analysis based on a unied framework. One looks at the short-run comparative
static e¤ects of possible policy measures and shocks in the presence of some key
structural features of the Cambodian economy. The other examines the possible
impact of labor standards on medium-run income distribution and the long-
run accumulation trajectory. Throughout the paper we follow the structuralist
tradition in making assumptions about di¤erent sectors based on stylized facts.2
Our short-run framework assumes that output and employment vary in the
tradable sector (via changes in capacity utilization), while relative prices vary
in the non-tradable sector to remove deviations from (general) equilibrium.3
1Although, the garment sub-sector, which is much more labor-intensive than the textile
one, heavily dominates this sector.
2See, for example, Blecker [1996] and Dutt [1990].
3As we will see below, since the vertically integrated tradable manufacturing sector does
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We then analyze the impact of various exogenous shocks. Some of the more
interesting results include our ndings that:
 A scal contraction or increased private savings results in a decline in
prot rates in both tradable sectors, and shifts the composition of output
in favor of the services sector.
 While a shift in (domestic or international) demand towards manufactures
increases the manufacturing sector prot rate at the expense of the ser-
vices sector, a shift in international demand towards services lowers the
prot rates in both sectors. Moreover, while the latter shock increases
services output at the expense of manufacturing output, greater demand
for manufactures increases output in both sectors.
 Higher labor standards in the manufacturing sector (as reected in higher
contractual wages) reduce output, employment, and the prot rate in that
sector but may increase these in the services sector. Thus, higher labor
standards are likely to hurt the manufacturing sector in the short-run,
unless countered by an increase in global demand for home manufactures
(for example, through preferred access to global markets).
Next, we explore the medium-run distributional implications of higher man-
ufacturing labor standards in a dynamic framework. Labor standards are mod-
eled using a conceptual wage oor. Insofar as there is a scarcity of labor that
is skilled enough to work in the tradable sector, a higher oor, in the presence
of strong spillover e¤ects from the manufacturing sector labor market to the
services one, could lead to a greater steady state prot share in the manufactur-
ing sector along with rising wages and technological progress. Barring strong
spillover e¤ects, however, the steady state prot shares decline in both sectors.
The penultimate section considers the impact of higher labor standards (as
modeled by long-run steady state prot rate di¤erentials) on the nature and
ownership of capital accumulation. Our results, once the (adjusted) prot
rates equalize at the new steady state, depend upon whether the labor stan-
dards are imposed in the foreign-owned segment of the manufacturing sector
or the domestically-owned one. In the former case, we nd that the stock
of foreign-owned capital declines over time while that of domestically-owned
manufacturing capital relative to that of services capital rises. In the latter
case, on the other hand, the stock of foreign capital is likely to rise, while the
composition of domestically-owned capital is likely to shift away from manu-
facturing and toward services. Finally, when standards are applied across the
entire manufacturing sector, the stock of foreign capital declines while the stock
not use domestic intermediate inputs, this implies that the price of the tradable manufactured
good is xed as long as costs are xed. Thus, the equilibrium value of the real internal
exchange rate is determined by changes in the price of the non-tradable good, as in the
dependent economy model, although for di¤erent reasons. More specically, while in the
canonical dependent economy model, international demand for the tradable good is perfectly
elastic (and hence the law of one price holds), in our model it is the domestic supply of
manufactured tradables that is perfectly elastic in the short run.
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of domestically-owned manufacturing capital relative to that of services rises.
Insofar as there is something special about the manufacturing sector, these in-
triguing ndings, which are driven in large part by plausible assumptions about
behavioral di¤erences between domestic and international investors, have inter-
esting implications for the long-run developmental path of the economy.
2 The Short-Run Framework
Some of the key structural features of our stylized economy include:
 Three sectors, including a tradable manufacturing sector (the M-sector),
a tradeable services sector (the S-sector), and a non-tradable traditional
sector (the N-sector). The latter consists of rural small industry, services,
and agriculture.
 A dual labor market with the tradable sector having contractual nomi-
nal wages and the non-tradable sector having a xed real (subsistence)
product wage.
 To reect Cambodias dollarization, all prices are expressed in terms of
the international currency. Moreover, the excessive degree of dollarization
suggests that monetary policy-related features can be abstracted away
from without much loss.
 Output adjustment in the manufacturing and services sectors and price
adjustment in the traditional sector in the short run.
 Relatively price-elastic international demand for manufactures but rela-
tively price-inelastic international demand for services. This reects the
brand product nature of Cambodias tourism o¤erings, and the reluctance
of tourists to change their travel destination in the short run.4
 Partial pass-through from costs into prices in the manufacturing sector
but full pass-through in the services sector. This reects the assumption
that tourism providers are few enough to collude in a cartel-like manner.5
 Manufactures use imported intermediate inputs while services use domes-
tically produced inputs. This reects the fact that Cambodian exports
are largely vertically integrated into international production networks.
 Demand for manufactures originates both from domestic sources and the
international market, while demand for tradable services originates from
the international market only. The government sector is assumed to
consume non-tradables only.6
4Over longer time horizons, however, this assumption is not realistic, and is relaxed.
5This could be due to the presence of high barriers to entry such as high sunk costs in
infrastructure which are not present in the highly mobile garment-manufacturing sector.
6This is a simplied representation of the stylized fact that a major proportion of gov-
ernment spending typically falls on non-tradables such as adminstration, infrastructure, con-
struction, etc. See Calvo et al. [1994], for example.
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 FDI (which is the only form of foreign capital in the economy) ows into
the manufacturing sector. Although Cambodia attracts FDI in the ser-
vices sector, according to UNCTAD [2006] most of the identiable FDI
stock is in the secondary sector, mainly garments and wood products .
We, therefore, ignore services FDI for the sake of simplication.
 For the short-run model, we assume that the prot rates do not equalize
across sectors, although these do e¤ect intra-sectoral capital ows. This
assumption is relaxed in the long-run model.
In light of these features and assumptions, we can write down several quan-
titative and pricing identities (the latter stated in terms of the US dollar).
Price Identities
PM = WMaM +
P rM
M
+ P bM (1a)
where the subscript M represents the manufacturing sector, PM = the (dollar)
price of the manufactured good, P  = the (dollar) price of all imported (in-
termediate or capital goods), WM = the (xed) nominal wage in dollar terms,
ai = the unit labor coe¢ cient for sector i (i.e., the amount of labor required
to produce one unit of output), bM = the unit intermediate input requirement
for the M-sector, and ri= the prot rate (per unit of capital stock) in sector i.
M =
QM
KM
 M;max represents the degree of (short-run) capacity utilization,
where Ki = the total capital stock in sector i and Qi= the total (nominal)
output of sector i.7
PS =  WMaS +
rSP

S
+
PN
E
bN (1b)
where the subscript S represents the services sector, 0 <   1, PN is the price
of non-tradables expressed in domestic currency, and E is the nominal exchange
rate (riels per dollar). Notice that the wage in the services sector is a constant
fraction of that in the manufacturing sector. Finally,
PN
E
=WNaN (1c)
Quantitative Identities
QM = CM +XM (2a)
QS = XS (2b)
QN = CN + ZN +
G
PN=E
(2c)
7See Table 1 for summarized denition of the variables.
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where Cj (j = M;N) and Xk (k = M;S) represent, respectively, the con-
sumption and exports of the associated good, G represents (xed) nominal gov-
ernment expenditure, while ZN denotes the quantity of domestic non-tradable
intermediates used . In the case of non-tradables, output is considered to be
xed consistent with its being a ex price sector with surplus labor. Next, we
turn to dening some behavioral characteristics of our model.
Prices and Prot Rates
Manufacturing and service sector rms are assumed to set prices by a mark-
up factor M on unit (and average) variable costs.
PM = (1 + M )"M (3)
where "M = WMaM +P bM . Firms in the manufacturing sector have a target
mark-up rate, M , so that,
M = M

P 
"M
1 
; 0 <   1 (3a)
where  is a direct measure of the degree of pass-through of costs changes into
prices. Thus,
rM =
MM
q
(4)
where M

= M1+M

is the prot share of manufacturing output and q is the
international price relative to that of manufactures. Note that, due to partial
pass-through, the prot share varies with average variable costs.
Similarly, in the services sector,
PS = (1 + S)"s (5)
where "S =  WMaS + PNE bN , and
rS =
SSqS
q
(6)
where S

= S1+S

is the prot share of services output and qS (= PS=PM )
is the per unit price of services output relative to that of manufactures (sim-
ilarly. qN = PN=PM .and q = P =PM ). The cartel-like ownership structure
of the services sector enables capitalists in that sector to maintain their share
of output following cost changes. For the non-traded sector, the presence of
underemployment and surplus labor, along with equation (1c) implies that:
!NaN = 1 (7)
where !N

= WNPN=E

is the xed real product wage in the non-tradable sector.
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Consumption spending
Domestic residents consume both manufactures and non-tradables, the pro-
portions being functions of the relative price. Using Z to denote total private
domestic consumption expenditure, we can express total nominal expenditures
on the two goods by domestic residents as follows:
PMCM = Aq
1+
N Z;  > 0 (8a)
PNCN = (1 Aq1+N )Z (8b)
where Z = WM (aMKMM+aSKdSs)+!NaN (PN=E) QN+(1 s)(rMP KdM+
rSP
Kds);Kdi is the stock of domestically owned capital in sector i, and s is
the savings rate. This specication allows for relatively elastic substitution
by domestic consumers between manufactured goods and non-tradables, 1 + 
being the relative price elasticity of demand for manufactures. Also, note that
Aq1+N is the share of manufactures in consumption, while 1 Aq1+N is that of
non-tradables. For the sake of simplicity, only capitalists are assumed to save.
Exports
The export functions are dened in real terms as follows:
XM = B (q
)1+ z; 0 <  < 1 (9a)
where z is a measure of world expenditures. Similarly,
XS = D

q
qS
1+
z;  1 <  < 0 (9b)
Investment
Let gdM , gdS , and gfM denote accumulation by domestic manufacturing
capitalists (that is gi = _Ki=Ki), domestic service sector capitalists, and foreign
manufacturing capitalists, respectively. Foreign investment in developing coun-
tries may sometimes crowd in domestic investment in non-traditional sectors.
Possible reasons include the greater international exposure of foreign rms, their
access to the latest information and technologies, and their ability to match host
endowments to global market needs.8 This is particularly true for countries like
Cambodia that do not have much of an industrial base, and rely for exporting on
being a part of vertically integrated global supply chains in specic industries.9
Thus, we dene our investment functions as,
gdM = 0 + 1(rM   rS) + 2gfM (10a)
gfM = 3 + 4 (rM   r) (10b)
8See, for example, Rhee and Belot [1990] for a study of the relevance of such factors in
developing countries.
9Mainly garments in the case of Cambodia. An interesting historical example in this
regard is the garment industry in Bangladesh. See Aitken et al. [1997].
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so that,
gdM = 0 +
1
q
MM   (1   24)
q
SqSS   (1   1) r (10a)
where 0 = 0+ 23; 1 = 1+ 24, and i > 0. We have, for simplicity, as-
sumed away the risk premium that international investors are likely to associate
with holding Cambodian assets. In order to provide macroeconomic closure,
domestic investment in the services sector is assumed to be the residual left over
after investment in the manufacturing sector.
Equations (1a) - (10a) yield, after manipulation,10 the following system of
four excess demand equations in three variables, M , qN , and S .11 EDM
represents excess demand in the manufacturing sector while EDS, EDN and
ED represent excess demand in the services sector, the non-tradable sector,
and excess macroeconomic demand (i.e., an excess of investment over national
savings), respectively. For mathematical convenience, the capital stocks are
normalized by Kds, with ki (= Ki=KdS) denoting capital stock in sector i
relative to that in the services sector. We list the equations here while leaving
a more intuitive explanation for later in this section.
Manufacturing sector (or M-sector)
Aq1+N
 WM
PM
[aMkMM + aSs] + !NaN
QN
KdS
qN + (1  s) [MkdMM + SSqS ]

+B (q)1+
z
KdS
  kMM = EDM (11a)
Services sector (or S-sector)
D

q
qS
1+
z
KdS
  s = EDS (11b)
Non-tradable sector (or N-sector)

1 Aq1+N
 WM
PMqN
[aMkMM + aSs] + !NaN
QN
KdS
+
(1  s)
qN
[MkdMM + SSqS ]

+ bNs +
g
qNKdS
 
QN
KdS
= EDN (11c)
where g is simply government spending in terms of the manufactured good.
10An unpublished mathematical appendix that explains the derivation of the equations in
this and the following sections in more detail is available from the author on request.
11Notice that qS is also unknown so that we have four unknowns to be precise. However,
this variable is determined directly by equation (5) once qN is known.
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Macroeconomic equilibrium (or IS, i.e., investment = savings)
gds +

0 +
1
q
MM   (1   24)
q
SqSS   (1   1) r

kdM +
g
qKdS
  s
q
(MkdMM + SSqS)  t

q
MkfMM = ED (11d)
Note the simplifying assumption that only FDI-related prots are taxed.
We abstract away from taxation-related considerations as far as domestic rms
are concerned in order to avoid complications arising from issues of incidence
(such as between workers and capitalists). As mentioned earlier, subscripts d
and f denote domestic and foreign-owned capitalist stocks, respectively, so that
KM = KdM + KfM . The IS equation incorporates the balance of payments
equilibrium, which in the absence of o¢ cial reserve transactions reduces to:
B (q)
z
KdS
+D

q
qS

z
KdS
  bMkMM   s
q
[MMkdM + SqSS ]
  MMkfM
q
+
g
qKdS
= 0 (12)
Put in words, FDI and exports nance: (i) imports of intermediate goods,
(ii) imports of capital goods funded by total private and public savings, and (iii)
prots repatriated by foreign rms. Substituting equation (11b) into equations
(11a), (11b), and (11d) and making use of equation (7) reduces our system to
three equations in two variables, M and qN .
Aq1+N
(
WM
PM
"
aMkMM + aSD

q
qS
1+
z
KdS
#
+
QN
KdS
qN
+(1 s)q
"
MkdMM
q
+ SD

q
qS

z
KdS
#)
+B (q)1+
z
KdS
 kMM = EDM
(13a)

1 Aq1+N
( WM
PMqN
"
aMkMM + aSD

q
qS
1+
z
KdS
#
+
QN
KdS
+
(1  s)q
qN
"
MkdMM + SD

q
qS

z
KdS
#)
+bND

q
qS
1+
z
KdS
+
g
qNKdS
 
QN
KdS
= EDN
(13b)
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gds +
(
0 +
1
q
MM   (1   24)SD

q
qS

z
KdS
  (1   1) r
)
kdM
  s
"
MkdMM
q
+ SD

q
qS

z
KdS
#
+
g
qKdS
  t

q
MkfMM = ED
(13c)
which for convenience can be summarized as follows:
M(M ; qN ;) = 0; MM < 0;MqN > 0 (20a)
N(M ; qN ;) = 0; NM > 0; NqN < 0 (20b)
IS(M ; qN ;) = 0; ISM < 0; ISqN < 0 (20c)
where  denotes the vector of exogenous variables or parameters and the signs of
the partial derivatives are explained more intuitively below. A brief discussion
of the three equations may facilitate comprehension at this point. The terms in
the curly brackets on the LHS of equation (13a) represent domestic demand for
manufactures, which depends on the real internal exchange rate qN , employment
in the two sectors, and domestic capitalist spending on manufactures, which is
a function of total sectoral prots. Finally, the last two terms on the LHS
represent manufactured exports and total output, respectively. Turning to
equation (13b), again the terms in the curly brackets on the LHS represent
demand for non-tradables originating from workers and capitalists. The next
two terms capture demand for non-tradable inputs and government spending,
respectively, while the nal term denotes total output of non-tradables. Finally,
equation (13c) represents the investment-saving balance with the rst three
terms capturing the private side of the balance (that is, private investment
minus private savings), and the last two terms capturing the public side.
It can be demonstrated that only two out of the three equations (13a) - (13c)
are independent. In other words, any of these three equations can be derived
from the other two. In the subsequent analysis, therefore, we use only two
excess demand conditions while ignoring the third one as redundant by Walras
law. Figure 1 illustrates the system consisting of equations (13a) and (13c)
graphically.12 The intuition underlying the curves can be explained as follows:
The MM curve represents the zero excess demand condition for the M-sector.
An increase in M creates excess supply in the M-sector although the excess
supply is partially o¤set by increased demand from M-capitalists and (newly
12Note that, given the local nature of our analysis, we have translated the system of (non-
linear) equations into linear curves in order to avoid possible complications arising from mul-
tiple equilibria.
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employed) M-workers. qN has to rise to remove this excess demand through:
(i) expenditure switching towards manufactures, (ii) the income e¤ect on N-
workers, (iii) higher S-capitalist prots and consumption (due to relatively price-
inelastic demand, the value of S-exports rises although their volume declines).13
The IS curve represents macroeconomic equilibrium (i.e., the saving-investment
balance). An increase in M boosts both M-sector investment and (public and
private) savings. Assuming that the latter e¤ect dominates,14 qN has to decline
to remove the excess supply thus created through a fall in S-sector protability
(and thus savings) and the consequent increase in M-sector investment.
Finally, the SS curve simply reects the negative relationship between the
relative price of non-tradable inputs and capacity utilization in the S-sector (see
equation 11b). The equilibrium value of S is determined alongside that of
qN , the latter, of course, being determined by the general equilibrium shown in
the right panel of Figure 1.
qN
M
M
I
S
EDM
ES
ESM
ED
υM
ESM
ES
EDM
ED
υS
EDS
ESS
S
S
Figure 1: The system of excess demand conditions represented graphically.
3 Comparative Statics
This section analyzes some policy experiments. Table 2 summarizes the results.
3.1 A Fiscal Contraction
Let us begin with a simple experiment. Since the government sector consumes
non-tradables only, a cut in its spending has no direct e¤ect on demand for
13The decline in S-sector employment works in the opposite direction but this e¤ect is
likely to be small, especially given that  < 0, and that this sector employs a relatively small
proportion of the work force.
14Note that this implies that 1kdM < skdM + tkfM , which is similar to the standard
stability assumption made in one sector models with output adjustment.
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manufactures. An excess macroeconomic supply is created, however, leading
to a real internal depreciation, which in turn, lowers output in the M-sector
as expenditure switches towards non-tradables. The real internal depreciation
also results in an increase in services output, thus shifting the composition
of tradable output from manufactures to services. Figure 2 illustrates our
analysis.15 The upshot is that while M-exports are not a¤ected, S-exports
fall in value, so that the value of total exports declines. Since the prot rate
declines in both sectors,16 so does the inow of FDI.
The real internal depreciation, which is a rather standard result in depen-
dent economy models with a tradable and a non-tradable sector, helps explain
why scal restraint is often seen as a part and parcel of export-led growth.17
However, notice that while the result is in line with conventional wisdom, the
structure of our economy means that the broader outcome is not, at least if the
aim is to have manufacturing-based export-led growth. In fact, manufacturing
output declines in our framework, and it is the volume of exports of services
that rises. Moreover, the reduction in foreign investment undermines prospects
for an FDI-based export boom.
Finally, although we do not provide the detailed analysis here, Table 2 shows
that a rise in the tax rate, not surprisingly, will have identical e¤ects.
qN
M
M
I
S
υMυS
Figure 2: The consequences of a scal contraction
3.2 An increase in the private saving rate
A rise in private savings (as opposed to public savings, as in the previous
section), again has the direct macroeconomic e¤ect of creating excess supply,
15Mathematically, it can be shown that Mg = 0 and ISg > 0.
16 In the M-sector because M declines and in the S-sector because qS declines, although
the rise in rS tampers the latter decline.
17See, for example, Eichengreen [2007].
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which puts downward pressure on M-sector output and the relative price of non-
tradables. However, in this case, there is a direct e¤ect on the M-sector too,
namely that of reducing demand for manufactures and thus M-sector output,
which puts upward pressure on the relative price of non-tradables.18 While M
unambiguously declines as a result, it can be shown that the new equilibrium
level of qN is lower as well (in graphical terms, the IS curve shifts more than the
MM curve in Figure 3 below). Again, these are standard results the former
in models with output adjustment and the latter in dependent economy models.
However, the resulting increase in services sector output is an interesting feature
of our framework, with implications for the future evolution of the economy.
qN
M
M
I
S
υMυS
Figure 3: The impact of increased private savings
3.3 Shift in World Demand Towards Domestic Services
Exports
An increase in global preference for domestic services (i.e., an increased inow
of tourists) that increases D has the direct e¤ect on the M-sector of creating
excess demand for Cambodias manufactures (thanks to greater employment
and prots in the S-sector). The indirect e¤ect of the resulting increase in
manufacturing output is to create excess macroeconomic supply and thus to
put downward pressure on the real internal exchange rate. The direct e¤ect of
the shift in world demand on the macroeconomic side is to create excess supply,
owing to greater S-sector protability (which causes investment diversion from
the M-sector) and savings. A real internal depreciation results, the indirect
e¤ect of which on the M-sector is to put downward pressure on output through
substitution e¤ects. Thus, the real internal exchange rate is unambiguously
lower at the new equilibrium while since it can be shown that the direct e¤ect
18Mathematically, it can be shown that MS < 0 and ISS < 0.
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on the macroeconomic sector dominates (i.e., IS shifts more in the horizontal
direction than MM does in Figure 4) manufacturing output is also lower.19
Thus, greater world liking for domestic tradable services shifts output in
favor of the services sector. More interestingly, it leads to a real internal
depreciation, and lowers the prot rates in both sectors.
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Figure 4: A Shift in Global Preferences Towards Domestic Tourism Services
3.4 Shift in world demand towards domestic manufactures
Suppose that global consumers develop a greater preference for domestic man-
ufactures (i.e., there is an increase in B). Alternatively, one could assume that
Cambodian products get preferred access to world markets The only direct ef-
fect is on the M-sector, where the excess demand created results in an increase
in M-sector output, the excess savings being created then leading to a real inter-
nal depreciation. The prot rate increases in the M-sector while falling in the
S-sector, creating greater foreign and domestic investment in the former. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates this policy experiment. Thus, interestingly enough, an increase
in global preferences for domestic products raises services output regardless of
whether the increased preference is for services or manufacturing. This result
follows from the real internal depreciation caused by such a shock.20
On a related note, a shift in domestic demand towards tradables for reasons
other than relative price changes has similar e¤ects on relative prices, outputs,
accumulation and distribution. We, therefore, skip a detailed discussion of the
results, which are simply summarized in Table 2.
19Mathematically, it can be shown that MD > 0 and ISD < 0.
20Mathematically, it can be shown that MB > 0 and ISB = 0.
14
qN
M
M
I
S
υMυS
S
S
Figure 5: A shift in world demand towards domestic manufactures
3.5 Decline in manufacturing or service sector mark-ups
This and the next sub-section look at the e¤ects of changes in distributional
parameters on variables of interest. We begin with the consequences of a
decline in the manufacturing sector target mark-up, perhaps due to multilateral
trade liberalization and the resulting increased competition. Such a shock,
which will translate into a lower price for manufactured goods, would increase
domestic demand for manufactures on account of both income and substitution
e¤ects. Moreover, external demand will rise as well due to substitution towards
domestic manufactures. The direct e¤ect on the M-sector, therefore, is to
create excess demand for manufactures, putting upward pressure on output, the
indirect e¤ect of which on the macroeconomic balance is to create excess supply
and lower the relative price of non-tradables. The direct e¤ect of the change
in mark-up on the macroeconomic side is to create excess demand through
lowering savings and tax revenues.21 The indirect e¤ect on the M-sector of the
real internal appreciation resulting from this excess demand is to further boost
output. Thus, while manufacturing output and employment are unambiguously
higher at the new equilibrium, the net impact on the real internal exchange rate
is ambiguous. If the direct e¤ect on the macroeconomic side dominates, we
experience a real internal appreciation, otherwise a depreciation. In terms
of Figure 6, if the IS curve horizontally shifts more than the MM curve, the
real internal exchange rate appreciates and vice versa. Finally, the e¤ects on
equilibrium prot rates and rates of accumulation are also ambiguous. Notice
that the more sensitive manufacturing investment is to prot rate di¤erentials,
the greater the likelihood that the real internal exchange rate will depreciate,
and thus the greater the probability that S-sector protability will decline. Also,
the more sensitive international demand is to the relative price of manufactures,
21Assuming, as before, that s > 1, and that the valuation e¤ect on government spending
is not too large.
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the greater the likelihood that the M-sector prot rate will be higher.
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Figure 6: A decline in manufacturing sector mark-up
A decline in the S-sector mark-up has more or less similar e¤ects, if we
continue to assume that workers are the main source of domestic demand for
manufactures,22 except that the M-sector prot rate rises unambiguously.
3.6 Higher contractual wages in the manufacturing sector
(improved labor standards)
Finally, consider a scenario where an improvement in labor standards is reected
in higher contractual wages. The target mark-up rate remains unchanged in
this case, but the price of the manufactured good rises somewhat, while the ac-
tual mark-up declines (due to partial pass-through). M- and S-sector workers
will now demand manufactures in greater quantities but domestic capitalists,
N-sector workers, and foreign residents will demand less. Considering that the
international market is the major source of demand in our setting, an excess sup-
ply of manufactures is created, the indirect e¤ect of which via the resulting fall
in manufacturing prots is to create excess demand on the macroeconomic side,
thus putting upward pressure on the real internal exchange rate. The higher
wage rate increases the M-sector prot rate in terms of the capital good (due
to the positive impact on the price of manufactured output, which more than
compensates for the decline in the prot share), which has the direct macroeco-
nomic e¤ect of creating excess supply via greater savings and tax revenues.23
This puts downward pressure on the real internal exchange rate, which has the
indirect e¤ect of lowering the output of manufactures. Thus, M-sector output
falls unambiguously while the real internal exchange rate may be lower or higher
22So that higher demand due to increased S-sector employment dominates the lower demand
from S-sector capitalists. In this case, a decline in S creates excess demand for manufactures.
23Assuming plausibly that the valuation e¤ect on government spending is not too large.
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at the new equilibrium (see Figure 7).24 Note that the lower the degree of pass-
through into costs, the greater the likelihood that a real internal appreciation
will take place. In the extreme case, where pass-through is zero, say due to
highly competitive international conditions, the IS curve shifts very little, and
the real exchange rate unambiguously appreciates.
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Figure 7: Improved labor standards as reected in higher wages
4 Medium-Run Distributional Dynamics
In the medium-run, we relax the assumption of xed contractual wages in the
tradable sector, and consequently also that of xed distributional shares in
the two sectors, considering these as endogenously adjusting variables instead.
Moreover, while labor mobility is assumed to make service sector wages sensitive
to those in the manufacturing sector, the assumption of a constant di¤erential
is relaxed. In a broad sense, our framework has the properties of a conicting
claims model. Firms in the manufacturing sector are assumed to adjust prices
in response to deviations from a target prot share within constraints imposed
by international competition. Thus,
P^M = M (
   M ) + (P    PM ) (14)
where M is the degree of M-capitalist sensitivity to prot share deviation from
their target while  is a measure of the constraints on pricing imposed by foreign
competition. Workers in the manufacturing sector have a wage oor W
¯ M
in the
medium run, which is determined by prevailing labor standards. Alternatively,
W
¯ M
could be interpreted as the di¢ culty of ring workers if labor standards
take the form of increased job security (or more formal job contracts). Wages
rise, to a greater or lesser extent, in response to increases in productivity.
24Mathematically, it can be shown that M WM < 0 and IS WM < 0.
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W^M =   a^M + W¯ M ;  ;  > 0 (15)
where  is a measure of worker bargaining power insofar as they are able to share
in the benets of productivity increases, while  captures the e¤ect of having
a wage oor.25 We assume that a higher wage oor provides workers with a
more secure basis for negotiating wage increases, perhaps because the cost of
punishment in the form of within sector demotion declines. The evolution of
labor productivity in the manufacturing sector is a function of foreign invest-
ment in that sector. This reects the expectation that foreign investment leads
to technology transfer, introduction of new processes, and domestic adoption of
best practicesthrough institutional spillovers and labor turnover.26
 a^M = 0 + 1gfm; i > 0 (16)
Since, M = 1   WMaMPM   
M , 
M being the output share of intermediate
inputs, equations (14)-(16) yield:
_M
1  M = M =

1  
M
1  M

[(1   )(0 + 1gfm)  W¯ M ]+M (
   M )+(P  PM )
(17)
where gfm = gfm(M ; S), and @gfm=@i < 0 (see Table 1).27 Consider next
the behavior of the prot share in the services sector. Analogously to the M-
sector, capitalists in the S-sector have a target prot share. However, since they
face lower competition from abroad, capitalists can pass on any change in costs
to the consumers in the short- to medium-run, without paying much attention
to the cost of deviation from the international price. The service sector gets
workers either from the M-sector or from the non-tradable sector (which we now
suppress for analytical tractability). They prefer the M-sector workers (due to
education, skills, work ethic, etc.). A tightening of the M-sector labor market,
i.e., an increase in demand for M-sector output), therefore, creates conditions
conducive to S-workers successfully asking for higher wages.
P^s = s (
   S) ; s > 0 (18)
W^S = (WM  WS) + aMM; ;  > 0 (19)
where  is the sensitivity of S-sector workers to the wage gap relative to the
M-sector,  is the degree of labor market spillover from the M-sector, and  is
25Wage changes can, in addition, also be specied as a function of producer (or consumer)
price changes, but that does not qualititatively a¤ect our results.
26See, for example, Caves [1996] for a comprehensive survey. See also Javorcik [2004]. See
Aitken and Harrison [1999] and Barrios [2002] for studies that do not nd strong evidence of
such spillovers to the domestically-owned rms.
27A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for this sign to hold is that the decline in
capacity utilization dominate the rise in prot share so that the prot rate in the M-sector
falls. This assumption is highly plausible given the internationally competitive nature of
labor-intensive products.
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the (exogenously given) capital-labor ratio. Equations (18) and (19), along with
the denition of S yield the following equation of motion for the prot share
in the S-sector:
_S
1  S = S = s (
   S)  (WM  WS)  aMM (20)
Equations (17) and (20) give us a system of two non-linear, autonomous,
rst order di¤erential equations, which can be summarized as follows:
M = M (M ; S) (17)
S = S(M ; S) (20)
where @M@M < 0,
@M
@S
< 0, @S@M > 0, and, nally,
@S
@S
7 0. The last sign
requires some clarication. An increase in the prot share in the S-sector has
two opposite e¤ects. Starting from a steady state value, one e¤ect is to push the
prot share downwards (i.e., _S < 0) due to its above-target value (i.e.,  < ).
The other e¤ect is to reduce demand for manufactures (due to the shift of income
from non-savers to savers), which loosens the M-sector labor market, placing S-
workers in a weaker bargaining position, and putting upward pressure on the
prot share in that sector. If the former e¤ect dominates, @S@S < 0 (Case 1),
otherwise, @S@S > 0 (Case 2). Figure 8 illustrates the two cases graphically. In
Case 2, the existence of a locally stable node requires that the _S = 0 isocline
be steeper than the _M = 0 isocline, and that
@M@M  > @M@S .
4.1 The medium-run e¤ects of a rise in labor standards
Suppose that standards are raised through a policy that lifts the wage oor.
Figure 9 illustrates the e¤ects. One would expect such an action to undermine
the prot share in the M-sector (and, through labor market spillovers, in the S-
sector). This is indeed what happens in Case 1. A rise in W
¯ M
initially leads to a
fall in the M-sector prot share as workers bargain from a stronger position. As
manufacturing wages rise, so do S-sector wages. The re-distribution of income
towards non-savers raises manufacturing output and tightens the labor market,
putting further downward pressure on the S-sector prot share. However, this
spillover e¤ect is dominated by the ability of S-sector capitalists to stay close to
their distributional target, dampening the decline in their share. The simplest
transitional dynamics involve a monotonic (non-cyclical) decline in both prot
shares as these reach their new steady state values.
Case 2 presents a rather counter-intuitive (and perhaps more interesting)
result. Again, initially the prot shares decline in both sectors. However,
the labor market spillover e¤ect dominates the ability of S-sector capitalists
to approximate their target share so that when a distributional shift towards
non-savers tightens the labor market the e¤ect is to exacerbate the decline in
their share. Consequently, S continues to decline even as M reaches its
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steady state value. As the former falls beyond this point, foreign investment
rises (due to the rise in utilization and hence the prot rate), which, through
increasing manufacturing labor productivity, leads to a rising prot share in
that sector (note that since 0 <  < 1, workers get only a partial share of
the productivity increase). As the decline in S and parallel increase in M
continue, the redistribution towards savers in the M-sector dampens the decline
in the former as the labor market develops some slack. Both sectors may see
their distributional shares reaching their new steady state values without further
complications. Alternatively, if the distributional shares in the S-sector reach
a steady state value before that happens in the other sector, the continuing
increase in M-capitalistsshare leads to a rise in S-capitalistsshare as the labor
market continues to soften, giving the latter more bargaining power. The
upshot is that higher labor standards in Case 2 see the prot share decline in
the S-sector, but rise in the M-sector due to strong labor market spillovers.
Transitional distributional shares overshoot their steady state values in either
one or both sectors.
In brief, higher labor standards in the M-sector, under the assumptions made
in Case 2, lead to a higher prot share in that sector.
Figure 8: Two cases: Case 1 (low labor market spillover e¤ects), and Case 2
(signicant labor market spillover e¤ects).
5 Long-Run Considerations: Accumulation and
Sectoral Distribution of Resources
For the purposes of our analysis, we make the more realistic long-run assumption
that the manufacturing sector is an international price taker (so that PM =
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Figure 9: The e¤ects of raising the wage oor in the two di¤erent cases
P and q = 1). Logical consistency implies full capacity utilization in the
M- and S-sectors. For simplicity we continue to suppress the government and
non-tradable sectors, so that all domestic consumption is of manufactures. The
state variables, kdM and KfM are now allowed to vary during the transition to
the steady state.
Long-run considerations require re-specication of the accumulation func-
tions. Our closures are derived from the assumptions that in the long-run
steady state: (i) the economy generates adequate resources to nance all its in-
vestment needs, that is, the current account is balanced, and (ii) the structure of
the economy stabilizes insofar as its composition in terms of manufacturing and
services is concerned. As discussed below, these closures also imply long-run
steady state prot rate equalization. Assuming that labor standards impose
a burden on capitalists in the sectors that these are applied in, we specify the
following sectoral accumulation functions for the manufacturing sector:
gfM = K^fM = 5(frM   r); 0 < f < 1 (21)
gdM = gdS + 6(drM   rS) (22)
gd = k^dM = K^dM   K^dS = gdM   gdS = 6(drM   rS); 0 < d < 1 (23)
where gd is the rate of accumulation in the manufacturing sector relative to
that in the services sector, and f and d reect the extra costs imposed by
labor standards on foreign and domestic manufacturing capitalists, respectively.
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In other words, these parameters are inverse measures of the labor standard
premium that investors demand to invest in the manufacturing sector. This
specication assumes that the medium-run wage oor changes over time so that
investors develop expectations regarding the costs of labor standards, and adjust
their prot rate comparisons accordingly. These also have the property that
under the specied long-run closures, frM = r and drM = rS so that (labor
standards-adjusted) prot rates equalize between sectors.28
This set-up implies that our new system of excess demand equations in M
and qS can be written as follows:
M-Sector: (1 M bM )MkM+(1 S)SqS+(1 s)(M MkdM+SSqS)+Bz

KdS
 MkM = 0
(11e)
S-Sector: D

1
qS
1+
z
KdS
  S = 0 (11f)
IS: gdS   (s  6d) kdM
1 + kdM
M M  

s
kdM
+ 6

kdM
1 + kdM
SSqS = 0 (11g)
where international touristsplans are now specied to be price-elastic in the
long run so that  > 0. Manufacturing FDI is assumed to facilitate learning-
by-doing and other improvements that push out the technological frontier and
increase the maximum technologically feasible level of output for a given amount
of capital. Thus, M = (KfM ), where 0 > 0. It can be shown thatMM < 0,
MqS > 0, ISqS < 0, and under the plausible assumptions that s > 6, ISM < 0.
This assumption, which simply requires that the domestic investment response
to adjusted prot rate di¤erences in the two sectors not be too large compared to
the savings response, is consistent with our earlier analysis. Comparative static
exercises yield the results summarized in Table 3. The detailed derivation of
these results is relegated to the available upon request mathematical appendix.
5.1 The comparative dynamics of labor standards
This section analyzes the long-run e¤ects of an increase in labor standards in
manufacturing, considering separately the improvement of such standards in the
foreign-owned and domestically-owned segments of the manufacturing sector.
The results point to some interesting di¤erences in behavior depending on which
sector it is that the labor standards directly impact.
Our equations of motion consist of equations (21) and (23), which along with
Table 3 reveal the information required to represent our system graphically with
the help of Figure 10.29 Note in particular that,
28Moreover, when f = d, that is, the labor standard premium is uniform across the
manufacturing sector, rS = r.
29Again, the detailed derivations are not provided here but are available in the available
upon request appendix.
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rM = rM (kdM ;KfM ;d) and rS = rS(kdM ;KfM ;d)
with all the partial derivatives except for @rM@kdM and
@rM
@KfM
being positive. The
existence of a locally stable node or focus requires that the k^dm = 0 isocline
be steeper than the K^fM = 0 isocline.30 Notice that the northwestern and
southeastern quadrants are traps. This implies that the stock of foreign capital
and that of relative domestic manufacturing capital cannot be moving in the
same direction as the steady state equilibrium is approached.
kdM
KfM
ˆ 0fMK =
ˆ 0dMk =
Figure 10: Phase diagram summarizing the long-run model
5.1.1 Higher labor standards in the foreign-owned sector
A decline in f shifts the K^fM = 0 isocline downwards and to the left. The
transition to the new steady state equilibrium involves a monotonic decline
in both the stock of foreign capital and the relative stock of domestic man-
ufacturing capital (see Figure 11). Intuitively, higher labor standards in the
foreign-owned sector mean a lower standards-adjusted prot rate in that sector,
leading to capital outows. The decline in foreign capital stock, in turn, results
in a rise in the relative prot rate in the manufacturing sector (both because
rM rises and because rS declines). The result is higher domestic investment
in the manufacturing sector at the same time that the downward pressure on
foreign inows is dampened until the new steady state equilibrium is reached.
30Note that stability also requires that 0 be relatively small, that is, that the enhancement
of technological capabilities due to FDI be relatively limited. This requirement is likely to
be satised given the limited scope for such enhancements in the relatively unsophisticated
garment sector. If this requirement is not satised, however, we get instability and corner
solutions, with one or both of the state variables declining to zero.
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Thus, interestingly enough, higher standards directed at the foreign-owned man-
ufacturing sector leads to a rise in the stock of domestic manufacturing capital
relative to services capital. To the extent that manufacturing is the source of
positive externalities, this may be good news, although dampened by the fact
that lower foreign investment may imply less inward bound technology transfer.
kdM
KfM
ˆ 0fMK =
ˆ 0dMk =
Figure 11: Improved labor standards in the foreign-owned sector.
5.1.2 Higher standards in domestically-owned manufacturing
As seen in Figure 12, a decline in d shifts both isoclines downwards and to
the left. However, it can be demonstrated that the likely scenario involves the
k^dM = 0 shifting more, so that while the stock of foreign capital is higher at
the new steady state, the relative stock of domestically-owned manufacturing
capital is lower.31 The transition to the new steady state involves overshooting
of the foreign capital stock.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Higher labor standards result
in a lower standards-adjusted prot rate in the domestically-owned manufac-
turing sector. However, unlike the case where standards were improved in the
foreign-owned manufacturing sector, there is another direct e¤ect. The reduced
domestic investment creates excess savings, which puts downward pressure on
the manufacturing prot share and relative price of services, and thus on prot
rates in both these sectors.32 Since initially rM declines more than rS ,33 both
the foreign and domestically-owned relative manufacturing capital stocks too
31An alternative, relatively unlikely scenario involves both state variables attaining a lower
value at the new steady state. We ignore this scenario in the interest of brevity.
32Recall that @ri
@d
< 0, i =M;S.
33More formally, it can be shown that rM
h
1 +
@rM=@d
rM=d
i
> @rS
@d
. Notice that @rM=@d
rM=d
is
the labor standards-elasticity of the prot rate in the M-sector.
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initially decline until the foreign capital stock arrives at a transitory steady
state value. Beyond this point, the continued decline of the relative domestic
manufacturing stock raises rM so that foreign investment inows resume. The
foreign capital stock continues to grow while the relative domestically-owned
manufacturing capital stock declines until the new steady state is reached.
kdM
KfM
ˆ 0fMK =
ˆ 0dMk =
Figure 12: Higher labor standards in domestically-owned manufacturing
5.1.3 Higher labor standards in the entire manufacturing sector
Next consider a scenario whereby the government imposes higher labor stan-
dards in the manufacturing sector regardless of the nationality of the owners.
The accumulation functions now become:
gfM = K^fM = 5(rM   r); 0 < f < 1 (21)
gdM = gdS + 6(rM   rS) (22)
gd = k^dM = K^dM   K^dS = gdM   gdS = 6(rM   rS); 0 < d < 1 (23)
A comparative dynamic analysis similar to the one carried out in the previous
sub-sections indicates that both the isoclines again shift downwards and to the
left (see Figure 13). However, it can be demonstrated that the K^fM = 0
unambiguously shifts more, so that while the stock of foreign capital is lower at
the new steady state, the relative stock of domestically-owned manufacturing
capital is higher. The transition to the new steady state involves overshooting
of the relative domestically-owned manufacturing capital stock.
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Higher across-the-board labor standards result in a lower labor standards-
adjusted prot rate in both manufacturing sectors. As in Section 5.1.2, there is
another direct e¤ect. The reduced domestic investment creates excess savings,
which puts downward pressure on the manufacturing prot share and relative
price of services, and thus on prot rates in both these sectors. Since initially
rM declines more than rS , both the foreign and domestically-owned relative
manufacturing capital stocks too initially decline until the domestic relative
capital stock arrives at a transitory steady state value. Beyond this point, the
result of the continued decline of the foreign-owned stock is to raise rM while
lowering rS so that the domestic manufacturing stock builds up. The relative
domestic manufacturing stock continues to grow while the foreign capital stock
declines until the new steady state is reached.
Figure 13: Higher labor standards imposed across the manufacturing sector
The reader may have noticed that the fact that foreign capitalists do not
consume locally, and that all FDI is used up in importing capital goods (which
means that the foreign capital stock does not make an appearance in the macro-
economic balance equation) makes a huge di¤erence between the direct e¤ects of
f on the one hand, and those of d and , on the other. This di¤erence
plays a major role in driving the results of our comparative dynamic exercises.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper started out by developing a framework that incorporates several
stylized features of the Cambodian economy. In particular, it introduced a
variant of the dependent economy framework that takes into account the varied
nature of the Cambodian tradable sector. Our framework has a non-tradable
goods producing sector and two tradable goods producing sectors, one that
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produces manufactures as part of a vertically integrated global production chain
that sells in highly competitive markets and another that sells tourism-related
services in the form of a brand-name product. Cambodia is currently part of
a much discussed experiment called the Better Factories programsponsored
by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in collaboration with the World
Bank, under which Cambodian apparel manufacturers are provided preferred
access to the US market in return for demonstrated improvements in working
conditions for labor. This program, if successful, may become a template for
other countries. A major focus throughout the paper, and especially while
exploring comparative dynamics, therefore, was to analyze possible dynamic
consequences of higher labor standards using simple models.
Based on our initial framework, we carried out several comparative static
exercises to explore the consequences of various policy measures or exogenous
shocks. A scal contraction, for example, results in a real internal depreciation,
which is a rather standard result. Due to the real internal exchange rate change,
however, the composition of economy-wide output shifts in favor of tradable
services and away from tradable manufactures, rather than from non-tradables
to tradables, as in the canonical dependent economy model. Moreover, it
reduces the prot rate in both the tradable sectors, with implications for savings
and capital accumulation. Higher private savings have similar consequences for
sectoral distribution, prot rates, and the real internal exchange rate.
A shift in domestic or international consumer preferences towards domestic
manufactures results in a real internal depreciation, greater tradable output (in
both sectors), and diversion of investment from services into manufactures due to
di¤erential prot rate movements. A shift in international preferences towards
domestic services, on the other hand, while also resulting in a real internal
depreciation, has the e¤ect of shifting the mix of output towards services. More
interestingly, the prot rates fall in both tradable sectors, which in turn has
negative consequences for domestic and foreign investment.
Turning to raising labor standards through better wage contracts, our analy-
sis indicates that, given the small size of its domestic market, its high export-
orientation, and the competitive nature of international markets for labor-
intensive manufactures, such standards may hurt our stylized economy in the
short run, although the long-run e¤ects could be more salubrious. This un-
derscores the need to cushion the short-run impact through e¤ective incentives
such as preferential access to Cambodian products in high income markets.
Next, we extended our framework to analyze medium-run dynamic distrib-
utional considerations. In doing so, we simplied by assuming away the non-
tradable sector in order to focus on tradables. In the presence of weak inter-
sectoral labor market spillover e¤ects, we got the unsurprising result that higher
manufacturing sector labor standards, modeled as a rise in a conceptual wage
oor, reduce the steady state prot share in both sectors. This need not be
true, however, since the tightening of the manufacturing sector labor market due
to greater output in response to demand from more prosperous workers could
spill over into signicantly higher wages in the services sector, which, through
greater demand for manufactures, could metamorphose into a virtuous cycle
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with higher wages, rising manufacturing output, rising foreign investment, and
productivity enhancements coexisting with a higher prot share in the manu-
facturing sector as the economy arrives at its new steady state. Notice that
the key feature separating the two cases is the strength of the spillover e¤ects
from the manufacturing sector labor market to the services sector one. Strong
e¤ects in the form of higher wages in the services sector when manufacturing
employment rises makes the second (virtuous) case more likely.
Finally, we adapted our framework to explore long-run changes in steady
state sectoral capital stocks in a dynamic framework. Assuming that the tight-
ening of labor standards imposes additional costs on investors which are factored
into investment decisions, we considered three distinct cases: (i) in which the
standards are imposed on international investor-owned manufacturing rms (ii)
in which domestically-owned rms are targeted, and (iii) in which the entire
manufacturing sector is targeted. In the rst two scenarios, the stock of capital
in the directly a¤ected sector declines over time while that of the other sector
rises. This perhaps is not surprising given that the targeted rms are the ones
that bear the cost of the standards. Less intuitively, however, the imposition of
higher standards across the entire manufacturing sector yields results similar to
those derived when only the foreign-owned rms are targeted for improvement.
The main lesson emerging from our analysis is that Cambodias reliance on
selling in highly competitive global sectors makes raising labor standards a risky
enterprise unless accompanied by greater access to international markets (i.e., a
rise in B) in the short run. If steps are taken to cushion the initial impact, how-
ever, the long-run consequences could be healthy in terms of shifting domestic
resources towards the manufacturing sector. This nding arises in large part
from the plausible assumption that while international investors consider the
international prot rate di¤erential, domestic investors are more interested in
domestic inter-sectoral prot rate di¤erences. To the extent that factors such
as economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and opportunities for technological im-
provement through reverse engineering tend to be present to a greater extent
in the manufacturing sector, our analysis raises interesting questions about the
possible consequences of various policy actions. In particular, given the nu-
anced structure of the Cambodian tradable sector, it suggests that, even within
a simple framework, the impact of higher labor standards may be much more
complicated than would appear to be the case at rst glance.
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Table 1: Denitions of important variables
Variable Denition (subscript i = M, N, S and j = f, d)
Pi; P
 Domestic and international price levels, respectively
Wi; wi Nominal and real wages, respectively
W
¯ M
Wage oor in the manufacturing sector
ai Unit labor coe¢ cients
bi Intermediate input coe¢ cients
ri Prot rates
Xi Volume of exports
 Proportional gap between M- and S-sector wages
 i Mark-up factor
Qi Quantity of output
i Prot share of output
Ci Consumption of sectoral output
"i Unit variable costs of production (wages plus intermediate inputs)
 Pass-through coe¢ cient
qi Price of sectoral output relative to that of manufactures
Z; z; z Domestic nominal and real income, and world real income, respectively
 Price elasticity of substitution in domestic consumption
 International price elasticity of demand for manufactured exports
 International price elasticity of demand for services exports
G; g Nominal and real government spending, respectively
t Tax rate
gjk Rates of capital accumulation
Kji; kji Nominal and relative (to Kds) capital stocks, respectively
B Parameter reecting international demand for manufactures
D Parameter reecting international demand for services
ji Parameters reecting the animal spiritsof investors
s Average propensity to save
 Workers share of productivity growth
i Prot rate premium associated with labor standards
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Table 2: Short-Run Comparative Statics
qN vM vS rM rS M S qS gfM
Higher g     +     0 0    
Reduced t + +   + + 0 0 + +
Higher s     +     0 0    
Higher B   + + +   0 0   +
Higher A   + + +   0 0   +
Higher D     +     0 0    
Reduced M +=    +=  +=  +=    0 +=   
Reduced S + + +=  + +=  0   +=  +
Higher WM +=    +=    +=    0 +=   
Table 3: Long Run Comparative Statics
M qS rM rS
Increase in kdM   +   +
Increase in KfM   +   +
Increase in d + + + +
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